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Abstract
Prediction markets are powerful forecasting tools. They have the potential to aggregate private information, to generate
and disseminate a consensus among the market participants, and to provide incentives for information acquisition. These
market functionalities can be very valuable for scientific research. Here, we report an experiment that examines the
compatibility of prediction markets with the current practice of scientific publication. We investigated three settings. In the
first setting, different pieces of information were disclosed to the public during the experiment. In the second setting,
participants received private information. In the third setting, each piece of information was private at first, but was
subsequently disclosed to the public. An automated, subsidizing market maker provided additional incentives for trading
and mitigated liquidity problems. We find that the third setting combines the advantages of the first and second settings.
Market performance was as good as in the setting with public information, and better than in the setting with private
information. In contrast to the first setting, participants could benefit from information advantages. Thus the publication of
information does not detract from the functionality of prediction markets. We conclude that for integrating prediction
markets into the practice of scientific research it is of advantage to use subsidizing market makers, and to keep markets
aligned with current publication practice.
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Introduction
A prediction market is a marketplace for contracts whose payoffs
depend on the outcome of a future event. In a well-functioning
market, contract prices can be interpreted as forecasts about the
outcome of the event, derived from the beliefs of all market
participants. Contract types can be designed to elicit various aspects
of the probability distribution associated with an event [1]. One
popular contract type, for example, pays $1 if a specific outcome is
realized, and $0 otherwise. The price of such a contract can be
interpreted as the predicted probability of that outcome occurring.
In practice, prediction markets facilitate trading by generating
standardized contract rules, and are typically organized so that the
market forecast is salient and easily interpreted.
To the extent that market prices can be interpreted as collective
forecast, prediction markets disseminate, or broadcast, informa-
tion. Although the mapping from individual beliefs to market
prices is potentially complicated because individuals may differ in
their risk aversion and in the availability of funds for betting [2,3],
in practice prediction markets have been found to generate good
predictions for events ranging from product sales and horse races
to presidential elections [4,5]. By making collective forecasts
available to a broader public, the dissemination property of
prediction markets has the potential to generate social utility.
Prediction markets can also facilitate more complex information
processing tasks. If different market participants have different,
complementary pieces of private information, prediction markets
have the potential to aggregate this information. Aggregation of
dispersed information means that the market prediction is close to
the forecast of a hypothetical trader in possession of all the
information. A market that aggregates all available information is
said to display strong efficiency [6,7]. The information aggregation
property is illustrated by an example from Plott (1988) [8]: Suppose
an event has three mutually exclusive outcomes, X, Y, and Z. The
payoff of a contract depends on which outcome is realized. Half of
the traders in the market are informed that the outcome will not be
X, and the other half is informed that the outcome will not be Y. A
market that is able to aggregate this information will forecastthat the
outcome will be Z. This prediction differs from simply averaging the
traders’ initial beliefs. Information aggregation requires that traders
learn from the market. Laboratory experiments suggest markets can
accomplish information aggregation tasks reasonably well, although
the details of the process are not fully understood [8,9].
Because making reliable predictions is a key objective in science,
prediction markets offer potential benefits to scientific research [10,11].
Dissemination and aggregation propertiesofmarketsmightbevaluable
because knowledge in scientific research is often highly decentralized.
When settling a research problem, this may lead to diverging opinions
within the research community. Prediction markets yield a consensus
estimate on a scientific question that is communicated to market
participants as well as to outside parties such as funding agencies and
policy makers. The consensus disseminated by a functioning market
has the potential to be more precise than a consensus obtained from
traditional methods such as performing a meta-analysis of more or less
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consensus is important in order to generate agreement on what the
most important open questions are and thus helps to allocate resources
in an optimal way [12].
Prediction markets can also be used to fund research. Scientists
that invest in a well-designed research project will gain an
information advantage, i.e., their knowledge will be more accurate
than the current consensus. In a prediction market, this
information advantage can be used to re-capture the investment.
Incentives can be amplified by subsidizing market makers that turn
the zero-sum payoff structure of typical markets into a nonzero-
sum game. Institutions that fund scientific research might therefore
use prediction markets as an alternative to established ways of
allocating resources. Instead of distributing funds based on past
performance of researchers, they can use subsidized markets to
efficiently allocate funds to researchers according to their actual
contribution to a research problem. By rewarding an instanta-
neous, honest and unbiased disclosure of research findings,
prediction markets may therefore help to overcome problems
arising from publication-based incentives in the current practice of
research, such as publication bias [13,14] and delayed information
disclosure. However, given the pivotal role of publishing in
scientific research it is in our view crucial for potential applications
of prediction markets to ensure compatibility with publishing.
As a first step toward the integration of prediction markets into
scientific research practices, we designed an experimental
prediction market around a stylized process of scientific hypothesis
testing and publishing. Hypothesis testing was presented to the
participants within the context of a simple biochemical testing
problem that has been used in previous experiments on decision-
making in science [12]. We presented six mutually exclusive
hypotheses about a hypothetical biochemical pathway, and six
different tests giving binary results that helped to identify the
correct hypothesis. For each test, a positive result supported two of
the hypotheses. Tests gave error-prone results, i.e. occasionally
failed to provide a positive result for the true hypothesis (false
negative) or provided positive evidence for a false hypothesis (false
positive). The error rates were common knowledge. Further details
on the hypotheses and tests are given in the Methods section.
Participants traded contracts representing the six mutually exclusive
hypotheses. In each experimental market, 6 or 7 participants traded on
a web-based prediction market interface comparable to commercially
available market platforms. A subsidizing market-maker based on a
logarithmic scoring rule [15,16] was used to ensure liquidity despite the
small number of traders, and to provide additional incentives for
trading. Traders received a performance-independent fee of $15 in
addition to the earnings from the market. Earnings from the market
ranged from$1t o$40 and had a mean of about $14. Further details on
participants, automated market maker and subsidies are given in the
Methods section.
The participants could trade during 7 trading rounds. Before
each round, new information on the hypotheses was distributed in
form of a test result. We investigated three different settings that
differed in the way how information was distributed (see Fig 1A). In
Setting 1, information was always public. All participants received
the same test result at the same time, and could buy and sell
contracts in the following trading round. In Setting 2, information
was always private. In each round, only one of the participants
received a test result. This participant was chosen randomly before
the experiment, and was determined independently for each round.
Some oftheparticipantsthereforereceivedmore thanone testresult
while others received no information over the course of an
experiment. As in Setting 1, each disclosure was followed by a
trading round. In Setting 3, each piece of information was initially
private, but eventually became public. One participant, drawn at
random, received a test result before the trading round, just like in
Setting 2. But halfway through the trading round the market was
briefly suspended while the result was published, i.e. disclosed to all
participants. We used six different ‘‘information histories’’, each of
which differed in the tests and results that were distributed (see
Methods). Each of these six information histories was used once in
each setting, resulting in 18 different markets (Fig 1B). Each
participant could participate in only one market.
Results
One of the markets in Setting 1 is shown in Fig 2. We observe
that participants trade at high frequency. On average, each
participant traded more than 35 times over the course of the
Figure 1. Experimental Setup. (A) In each market, participants traded claims representing six mutually exclusive hypotheses in seven consecutive
trading rounds. At the outset of a trading round, information about the hypotheses in the form an error-prone test result, was disclosed either to all
participants (Setting 1), or to an individual participant drawn at random (Settings 2 and 3). In Setting 3, the information was first private but then
disclosed to the public. Each trading round took approximately three minutes. Trading was suspended for about two minutes between the trading
rounds when novel information was distributed, and in the middle of each trading round in Setting 3, when private information was made public.
After seven such trading rounds, the outcome was judged and the traders’ accounts were settled. An entire session, including instructions and
training on the market interface, took approximately 1 hr. (B) We used six different, randomly generated information histories (A–F), each of which
differed in the tests and results given to the participants. The information history used in the market shown in Fig 2 is, for example, given by: OZ false,
VO false, VZ false, OV true, ZV false, ZO true, VO true. Other information histories are given in the Methods. Each of the six information histories was
used once in each of the three settings, giving in total 18 markets. Each trader participated in only one market, which means that the markets were
not affected by differential learning effects.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008500.g001
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activities. Participants traded even in the absence of private
information, as observed in previous experimental asset markets
[17,18]. A lower trading volume than the one observed in the
markets would have been sufficient to generate a correct pricing.
Although all information was public and liquidity was high, we
observe differences between the market prices and probabilities of
the hypotheses as obtained by Bayesian updating (Fig 2G). This
mispricing likely reflects the participants’ limitations in informa-
tion processing and Bayesian updating. However, in general
contract prices approximately followed rational pricing, and the
final pricing was sufficiently precise for all participants to extract a
net profit from the market maker.
To quantify mispricing and compare the overall performance of
the market in the different settings, the Kullback-Leibler divergence
DKL PjjQ ðÞ ~Si ph i ðÞ log p hi ðÞ =qh i ðÞ ðÞ is calculated between a
vector P~ ph 1 ðÞ , ...,ph 6 ðÞ ðÞ containing the probabilities of the
hypotheses as obtained from Bayesian updating, and a vector
Q~ qh 1 ðÞ , ...,qh 6 ðÞ ðÞ containing the actual prices of the
contracts in the market using market maker prices [19]. This
measure of mispricing is proportional to the profit of a rational
trader who knows the correct probabilities and trades against the
market maker used in our experiments [15,16,20]. Final mispricing,
i.e.mispricing atthe endofthe lasttradinground,isshown forall18
markets in Fig 3. To compare mispricing between different settings
we use two-tailed paired t-tests on log-transformed final mispricing.
While mispricing in Setting 3 was similar to mispricing in Setting 1
(t=20.15, p<0.89), mispricing in Setting 2 was higher than in the
two other settings (Setting 1 vs. Setting 2: t=23.7, p<0.01; Setting
3 vs. Setting 2 t=23.8, p<0.01). We log-transform because a
Shapiro-Francia test rejects normality of the mispricing but not of
the log of mispricing (p-value 0.22).
Because in Setting 1 and 3, all information becomes public at
some point, the market disseminates public information, but is not
Figure 2. Example Market. (A)–(F) Prices of the six contracts over the course of one experiment session in Setting 1. Black dots indicate the trades
in a share. Black lines show the theoretical market maker prices for infinitely small trades. The green line shows the correct pricing. Between the
round (orange bars), trading is suspended, and new information is disclosed to the participants. (G) Mispricing. To quantify mispricing, we calculate
the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the probability distribution implied by the market prices and the correct Bayesian posterior. Mispricing is
typically generated when new information is released, and is subsequently reduced by the traders (see for example trading round 1 and 2). As it
becomes more and more likely that the first hypothesis (ZOV) is the correct one, the traders in this session start overshooting in their estimate for the
probability of this first hypothesis. This generates increasing mispricing in rounds 3–5. In round 6, the disclosed information reduces mispricing. This
means that in this round, reality (i.e. correct prices) catches up with the market forecast. Prices at the end of the last round give a good estimate of
the correct probabilities. (H) Net wealth of the seven traders in the market. The participants start with a cash position of 100,000, equivalent to USD
10. Over the course of the experiment they invest into the shares and thereby change the pricing of the shares and their own net wealth. (I) Final
payoffs. After the last round, the hypotheses are judged: for each share of the correct hypotheses, participants receive a payoff of 100. This payoff is
added to their cash position and determines the payoff. In this session all participants end up with a net gain. This illustrates the non-zero sum nature
of trading due to the subsidizing market maker.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008500.g002
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final mispricing should only depend on the participants’ ability to
estimate the correct probabilities. One would therefore not expect
systematic differences in the performance in both setting, which is
indeed what we observe. Setting 2, in contrast, requires the
aggregation of private information. This task is more complex then
the simple dissemination of information. In line with this, markets
in Setting 2 show higher final mispricing for all of the six
information histories.
In order to estimate whether the markets in Setting 2
aggregated private information, we compare the observed market
forecasts against the average belief of a set of (hypothetical)
rational individuals that all receive the same information as the
market participants, do the correct Bayesian updating, but do not
interact in a marketplace. In three of the markets, such an average
belief would give a better forecast than market prices (see Fig 3).
Thus, these markets clearly fail to aggregate information correctly.
In the three remaining markets, prices produced forecasts that
were considerably better than average belief. For these markets,
performance falls into the range of the performance in the settings
with public information. This indicates that the markets are in
principle capable of aggregating information, but sometimes fail to
do so.
In Setting 2 and 3, participants have private information, at
least for some time. For these settings we can investigate whether
participants can gain a profit from having an information
advantage. This is important if prediction markets are to provide
incentives to invest into research to gain an information
advantage. We assess the relation between the profit and the
information received by a participant based on two quantities,
namely the support that a test provides for the true hypothesis, and
its informativity. Both quantities account for the fact that the value of
a piece of information depends on the information that precedes it.
To give an extreme example, if the true hypothesis is already
known with certainty, then additional information is of no value.
The support that a test result gives for the correct hypothesis can
be quantified as S~log p hT ðÞ
0=ph T ðÞ

, where p(hT) is the prior
and p(hT)9 is the posterior probability of the correct hypoth-
esis. Findings that maximize the posterior probability of the
correct hypothesis are the most valuable ones. The support
S~log p hT ðÞ
0=ph T ðÞ

is proportional to the reward for increasing
the probability of the correct hypothesis from p(hT)t op ( h T)9 as
provided by the market maker used in our experiment. However,
calculating S requiresknowing the correct hypotheses. A trader in our
experiments can only assess the expected value of S, given by the
Kullback-Leibler distance between the prior and posterior probability
distribution P and P9, DKL PjjP0 ðÞ ~Siph i ðÞ
0 log p hi ðÞ
0=ph i ðÞ

.
This informativity measure is equivalent to the mispricing measure
used above and here quantifies mispricing from the viewpoint of a
trader who received novel information, and determines the expected
profit that can be gathered based on the information advantage.
Analysis of the payoffs reveals that the correlation between
support S and net profit is stronger than the correlation between
informativity and net profit: While the correlation between payoff
(in virtual money units) and informativity was positive but not
statistically significant (Setting 2: OLS, coefficient on informativity:
79,895, p-value<0.2; Setting 3: OLS, coefficient on informativity:
49090, p-value<0.6), we find a statistically significant positive
correlation between payoff and support in both Setting 2 (OLS,
coefficient on support: 47,039, p-value<0.04) and Setting 3 (OLS,
coefficient on support: 101,040, p-value , 0.01). This result means
that in both settings, participants gained a profit from having an
information advantage, particularly when the information was
correct.
In a post-experiment questionnaire, subjects self-reported their
familiarity with Bayes’ rule and in a separate question were asked
to make a Bayesian inference. We generated a binary variable that
took on the value 1 if subjects reported being familiar with Bayes’
rule and/or made the correct Bayesian inference. We observe a
positive relation between this measure and net profit. The effect is
statistically significant in Setting 2 (coefficient: 56,867; p-value:
0.05), but not in Setting 3 (coefficient: 3,620; p-value: 0.93).
Subjects also reported their previous experience of betting on
sports events or similar, as well as previous stock market
experience. We combined this information to generate a binary
variable proxying for experience of gambling and/or trading. We
observe a positive relation between this self-reported measure of
experience net profit in the experiment, but the effect is not
statistically significant (coefficients in Setting 1 and 2, respectively:
19,225; p-value: 0.40 and 32,271; p-value: 0.29). Controlling for
the aforementioned individual characteristics in the regression
analysis does not affect our qualitative results.
Discussion
Previous studies have examined several aspects of experimental
assetmarkets,includingtheeffectofprivateinformation[8,9,21–24],
sequential information arrival [17], Bayesian updating [18,25–29],
and intellectual discovery processes [30]. We extend this research
by studying prediction markets as they would be used in the
practice of scientific research. We frame the information aggrega-
tion task as one of scientific discovery, include publication and use a
computerized prediction market interface with an automated,
subsidizing market maker.
We tested three settings that differed in the way that
information was disseminated. In Setting 1, the information was
always public, and mispricing was low. Because no trader ever had
Figure 3. Mispricing after the final trading round. Market
efficiency, measured as the mispricing at the end of the final trading
round, was considerably higher in the setting with public information
(Setting 1) than in the setting with private information (Setting 2). The
setting with private information that was later made public (Setting 3)
performed similar to the market with public information only (Setting
1). In the setting with private information, prices in three markets gave
better forecasts than average trader belief. In the three remaining
markets, average trader belief would have given better forecasts.
Mispricing is shown as Kullback-Leibler distance. Predictions in well-
functioning markets typically fall within a 5–10% margin around the
correct probabilities. In the non-functioning markets (A2, C2, E2) prices
differed from the correct probabilities by as much as 50–80%. In other
words, predictions in these markets were far away from the correct
probabilities and gave, for example, probabilities of 10% instead of 90%
for the correct hypothesis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008500.g003
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arose from being faster than other traders at updating prices to
incorporate new information, or from exploiting mispricing due to
others’ miscalculations. In Setting 2, different participants had
different pieces of information that were private at all times. In this
setting, mispricing in three of the six markets was comparable to
the mispricing in the first setting. The other three markets,
however, showed substantial mispricing at the end of the last
trading round. Thus, information was not aggregated in an
efficient, reliable manner in this setting. Nevertheless, participants
could profit from an information advantage. In Setting 3,
participants received private information that was subsequently
made public. In this setting, mispricing was as low as in Setting 1.
In contrast to Setting 1, but similar to Setting 2, there was a clear
positive relationship between net profits and having an informa-
tion advantage. Thus, the markets in Setting 3 combined the
advantages of the two other Settings. Markets gave good forecasts
about the probabilities of the hypotheses, while at the same time
allowing participants to profit from information advantages. This
indicates that combining publishing and prediction markets might
be an attractive first step toward making prediction markets
operational in science.
Publishing of information in the context of scientific research is
a much more complex process than the one studied in our
experiments. Therefore, further theoretical and empirical investi-
gations will be required to study whether potential trading and
publishing strategies are incentive-compatible under more realistic
conditions. Our results can at best point to the potential benefits
that might arise from combining publishing and trading. Despite
their potential benefits, however, prediction markets on scientific
issues are currently rare. Aside from regulatory problems that have
been outlined recently [5,31], this might be due to problems
specific to the practice of science. In the following, we discuss
problems that arise specifically for science applications.
Prediction markets function well when traders are numerous.
Scientific expertise, however, is scarce. Consequently, liquidity
constraints can be expected to be a problem for prediction market
application in the context of scientific research. As our experiment
shows, this problem can be mitigated through the use of
automated market makers such as the logarithmic market scoring
rule proposed by Hanson [15].
Participants’ prior trading experience has been found to be an
important determinant of market efficiency [9,18,21,22,26,27]. In
our study, familiarity with, or successful application of Bayes’ rule
showed a statistically significant positive correlation with the payoff
of a participant. The correlation between profit and trading
experience was positive but not statistically significant, probably
because our experimental design was not as powerful for detecting
experience-dependent effects as previous studies were. Research-
ers, however, cannot be expected to have extensive trading
experience and experience with Bayesian inference, and may not
be used to thinking about prices as information signals. This could
be mitigated through some initial training. In addition, bets could
be made by research groups, rather than individual researchers.
Moreover, markets can be rational even if the participants, on
average, are not: prices, and hence the market forecast, are driven
by the marginal transaction and not by average beliefs [25,32–34].
Our experiment indicates that when prediction markets are a
complement to publication, markets might remain functional even
if information is not revealed by a researcher to the market.
Mispricing may arise due to erroneous interpretation of market
signals as well as strategic attempts of participants to mislead other
traders. Uncertainty about the prevalence of traders with inside
information may cause traders to incorrectly infer that an
uninformed trade is actually an informed trade, and adjust their
beliefs accordingly [35–37]. Recent theoretical work has shown
that when information signals are not conditionally independent,
prediction markets may not necessarily provide incentives for
immediate and truthful revelation of information [20]. However,
the potential impact of both misleading errors and misleading
strategic behavior is diminished when information can be made
public, suggesting that an added value arises from the combining
prediction markets and conventional scientific publication.
Participants may also attempt to manipulate the market in order
to shed a favorable light on their own research. Experimental
studies have shown that prediction market manipulation is difficult
to achieve in practice [38–40].
Besides regulatory issues [5,31], one of the major obstacle to a
wide-spread use of prediction markets in science might come from
difficulties to find suitable questions. Prediction markets perform
best for contracts that are judged at a specific point of time in an
objective fashion. Contracts on products from scientific research
(‘‘Will there be an FDA approved HIV vaccine by 2015?’’) might
therefore be suitable for trading on a prediction market and might
disseminate valuable information to a broader public. Scientific
hypothesis, on the other hand, can usually not be judged with
absolute certainty based on a single event. Moreover, when tests
are error-prone, absolute certainty is never attained. Scientific
research usually develops a consensus about a theory or
hypothesis, rather than absolute certainty, and this consensus
typically emerges over time rather than due to a specific event.
One attractive option is to trade contracts on the outcome of an
experiment. Contracts payoffs could, for example, depend on
which of a set of competing hypotheses agrees best with the
outcome of a specific experiment. This simply requires a suitable
judgment technology that is agreed upon in advance and is
common knowledge to the market participants. Alternatively, one
could bet on the results that will be published by a specific point in
time. This is particularly suitable for fields where experiments are
registered before they are performed, and are standardized, so that
overall estimates can be generated by pooling several experiments.
The outcome of a set of clinical trials on the effect of a standard
versus a novel treatment might, for example, be suitable for a
prediction market. Based on our experiments one might speculate
that such linking of markets and scientific publishing generates
more reliable forecasts, as well as incentives for seeking an
information advantage.
Methods
Participants
In total, 124 participants were recruited by the CLER-Lab at
Harvard Business School. Most participants were students from
the Boston area. Median age was 21, with approximately equal
numbers of male and female participants. Participants received a
performance-independent fee of $15 in addition to the payments
earned in the experiment.
Ethics Statement
The experiment was approved by Harvard University CUHS
(F16041-101). Written informed consent was obtained from all
participants.
Hypotheses Used in the Experiments
The hypotheses are framed within the context of molecular
biology. Suppose there are three genes (A, B, and C) that are
known to interact in a linear biochemical pathway: The first gene
activates the second, which in turn activates the third. The order
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(ABC, ACB, BAC, BCA, CAB, and CBA) that form the set of
hypotheses. Knowledge on these hypotheses can be characterized
by six probabilities p(h1), … , p(h6).
Information from Binary Tests
For identifying the correct hypotheses, participants receive
pieces of information from binary tests. The results indicate
w h e t h e ro rn o tas p e c i f ic gene activates another, i.e. whether A
activates B, A activates C, etc. Thus there are six different tests
(AB, AC, BA, BC, CA, and CB). Each test supports two of the
hypothesis, and each hypothesis is supported by two tests. A
positive result on test AB, for example, supports the sequences
ABC and CAB, while sequence ABC is supported by positive
r e s u l t so nt e s tA Ba n dB C .A l lo ft h et e s t sa r ee q u a l l yp r o n et o
type I and type II errors, and the error rates were common
knowledge to all participants. We used the error rates a =0 . 1 2
and b = 0.3. These values are higher than the values of a,0.05
and b,0.2 that researchers traditionally aim to achieve in the life
sciences. We use these error probabilities to ensure that in the
experiments, participants are exposed to errors at a considerable
frequency. After a test has been disclosed, the probabilities
associated with the hypotheses can be updated according to
Bayes’ Theorem.
Bayesian Updating
The posterior probabilities after test ej are given by
ph ijej

~ph i ðÞ pe jjhi

=Siph i ðÞ pe jjhi

for a positive test result,
and ph ij*ej

~ph i ðÞ 1{pe jjhi
 
=Siph i ðÞ 1{pe jjhi
 
for a
negative test result. The probability pe jjhi

of getting a positive
result on test j given that hypothesis i is true equals 12b if test j
supports hypothesis i, and a if it does not support hypothesis i.
Trading Platform
Participants used a web-based prediction market to trade
contracts representing the six hypotheses. After an initial
instruction period on a practice market, each participant received
login details for a trading account that was funded with 100,000
virtual money units (VMU). This endowment was equivalent to
USD 10. Contracts for the correct hypotheses paid VMU 100 at
the end of the experiment, contracts representing one of the false
hypotheses paid VMU 0.
Market Maker
The trading platform used an automated marker maker. This is an
algorithm that offers a buying price and a selling price at all times, thus
ensuring that there is always a counterparty with which to trade. The
market maker takes a risk, because the net portfolio of claims it buys
and sells typically do not cancel each other out. We used a logarithmic
scoring rule as the basis for the market maker. The algorithm uses the
net sales (S1,…,S 6) the market maker has done so far foreach of the six
claims to determines the prices for a infinitesimally small trade in claim
ia sqh i ðÞ ~100 exp Si=b ðÞ =Sjexp Sj=b

. Parameter b determines
liquidity and maximal subsidies provided by the market maker. We set
the liquidity parameter to b=2,000.
Information Histories
Information histories were generated by randomly choosing one
of the 6 tests for each round and subsequently generating the test
result based on the error probabilities given above. The resulting
six histories are: History 1: BA false, CB false, CA false, BC true,
AC false, AB true, CB true; History 2: BC true, BC true, CB false,
AC false, BC false, CB false, CB False; History 3: AB true, AC
true, AB true, AB true. CB false, BA false, CA false; History 4: CB
false, AB true, CA false, BC true, BA false, BA false, CB false;
History 5: BA false, CB false, BA true, AB true, AB true, BC false,
BC true; History 6: BA false, BC true, BA false, CB true, CB false,
AB true, BC true. To avoid contamination between settings, we
changed the labels on the tests and hypotheses between each
market and setting.
Informativity and Support in the Context of the Settings
Let P be the vector of probabilities (p(h1), … p(h6)) implied by
the market prices. Suppose a trader whose beliefs are consistent
with the current market P receives a new piece of information. He
correctly updates his beliefs to P9 and trades until market prices
reflect his updated beliefs. If trading against a market maker like
the one described in ref.[15] and used in our experiment, the
resulting profit is b log p hT ðÞ
0=ph T ðÞ

, where hT denotes the true
hypothesis. Therefore, in Setting 2, one would expect a traders’
profit to be proportional to the support S~log p hT ðÞ
0=ph T ðÞ

,a t
least in the absence of budget constraints. Of course, the trader
does not know the correct hypothesis, and therefore will expect a
payoff of DKL P0jjP ðÞ ~Siph i ðÞ
0 log p hi ðÞ
0=ph i ðÞ

. Note that
while S~log p hT ðÞ
0=ph T ðÞ

takes negative values for false
findings, and positive findings for true findings, DKL is always
non-negative, even if a test result is erroneous. To realize the profit
in Setting 2, a trader has to wait until the market is judged, because
unwinding the new positions by selling contracts merely moves
prices back from P9 to P. In Setting 3, traders can in principle
unwind their positions at a small loss once piece of information has
been made public, because in contrast to Setting 2 other traders
should keep the prices close to P9. Therefore, in this setting, traders
could choose to realize a profit proportional to DKL P0jjP ðÞ ~
Siph i ðÞ
0 log p hi ðÞ
0=ph i ðÞ

immediately after their information is
disclosed, rather than waiting until the market is judged.
Prior for Calculating Informativity and Support
Calculating S and DKL requires a prior probability P. This prior
could be taken from either correct Bayesian updating or from
actual market prices. In a perfect market they are identical. In
markets where mispricing is prevalent, it is suitable to use actual
market prices because these prices likely provide a better
representation of the actual beliefs of the traders. We therefore
use market prices to calculate informativity I and support S of a
test result.
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